

Nuclear Safety

Human and Organizational Factors

Lessons from Fukushima

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**International
Experts Meeting**

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What happened at Fukushima?

- **Earthquake and Tsunami (Beyond Design external events)**
- **SBO, (small-scale LOCA)**
- **Cooling failure**
- **Reactor core damage / Containment failure**
- **Fuel meltdown**
- **Hydrogen explosions at reactor buildings**
- **Large release of radioactive materials**
- **The worst “complex disaster”**







What went wrong?


Manmade disaster

- Human error
- Inaction, willful negligence
- Failure in safety-first

Flawed safety culture (the “myth of 100% nuclear safety”)

Emergency response

- TEPCO
- Command center
- Regulatory bodies



Was the accident preventable?

Yes, if...

- **“Safety first” policy had been strictly enforced; risks had been squarely faced;**
- **Severe accident measures (defense-in-depth) were in place (esp. natural hazards);**
- **International safety standards and good practices had been followed;**
- **Delays in reinforcements had been avoided.....**

Could have been worse?

Some good luck

- Survival of power lines
 - Fukushima NPP 2
 - Onagawa
 - Tokai NPP
- Emergency operation center
- Spent fuel pool at Unit 4

Organizational / Human factors

- Lack of regulatory independence**
- Cozy, collusive relationship
 (“regulatory capture”)**
- Weak SA response measures
 (in particular against tsunami)**
- Inward-looking attitude**

(Conti'd)

Governance problems

- Responsibility gap in crisis management**
- Fragmented bureaucratic handling**
- Risk communications**

Human factors

- Expertise**
- Manuals**
- Drills/training**

Specific Recommendations (Kurokawa Report)

- 1 Set up a permanent parliamentary body dedicated to nuclear issues, including for oversight of new regulatory bodies;
- 2 Review the nation's crisis management system to clarify the role and responsibility of government, local authorities, operators;
- 3 Urgent government measures needed for the health of the affected population, radiation monitoring, rehabilitation of communities, decontamination, etc.;
- 4 Governance reform at TEPCO; transparency in relations between regulators and utilities; mutual oversight system among power companies;
- 5 Requirements for new regulatory bodies;
- 6 Drastic reform of nuclear-related legislation;
- 7 Set up independent investigation commissions comprising outside experts to continue work on unresolved or unaddressed issues.

Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)

(Established September 2012)

Independence


- **Clear separation of Regulation from Promotion**
- **An independent Commission**
(under the Ministry of the Environment)

Integration

- **All nuclear regulatory functions integrated:**
“3 S” (safety, security, safeguards);
Radiation monitoring; RI

Transparency

Integrated and Independent



AEC : Atomic Energy Commission

METI : Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

MEXT : Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

MOE : Ministry of the Environment

NISA : Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (abolished)

NSC : Nuclear Safety Commission (abolished)


NRA's Core Values and Principles

(Mission statement)

- **Learn and absorb lessons from Fukushima and never allow such accidents again;**
- **Restore public trust is of utmost importance;**
- **Foster a genuine safety culture; Highest priority on public safety;**
- **Independent decision-making based on scientific and technological information, free from any outside pressure or bias;**
- **Achieve genuinely effective regulations rather than formalities;**
- **Open and transparent organization: avoid self-isolation, self-righteousness;**
- **High ethical standards, sense of mission, rightful pride;**
- **Swift and effective response readiness to all emergencies.**

NRA: Current and future activities

- **TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP**
- **Designing new regulatory requirements**
- **Fracture zones surveys**
- **Preparedness and evacuation guidelines**
- **Safety assessment regarding shutdown reactors (50)**



Policy on New Safety Regulations

1. Amendments to the Nuclear Regulation Act (promulgated in June 2012)

- **Mandatory severe accidents measures;**
- **Mandatory back-fitting;**
- **40-year operational limit for NPPs (with possibility of up to 20-year extension)**

Policy on New Safety Requirements (conti'd)

2. Strengthening Design Basis

- **Enhanced measures against extreme natural hazards**
- **Stringent criteria for active faults**
- **Fire protection, tsunami inundation, etc.**

3. Severe accident measures

- **Defense-in-Depth**
- **Robust measures for preventing core damage, containment failure...**
 - e.g. Filtered venting system (BWR)
- **Preventing hydrogen explosion**
- **Measures against terrorism, unintentional plane crash**
- **Specialized safety facility**

Structure of proposed requirements

<Pre-existed>

<New>

Design basis
(Based on single failure, etc.)

Natural phenomena
Fire
Reliability
Reliability of power supply
Ultimate heat sink
Function of other SCCs
Seismic/Tsunami resistance

Suppression of radioactive materials dispersal
Specialized Safety Facility
Prevention of CV failure
Prevention of core damage
Natural phenomena
Fire
Reliability
Reliability of power supply
Ultimate heat sink
Function of other SCCs
Seismic/Tsunami resistance

(SA Measures)
NEW

Reinforced

Reinforced

International Dimension

-IAEA:

Inviting IRRS, IPPAS as soon as ready

- Bilateral cooperation:

**US, France, UK, Russia, Canada, Ukraine,
Belarus and others**

-Regional trilateral cooperation:

Japan, Korea, China

- International organizations

Thank you for your attention !